Files
app/backend/fluksio/core/security.py
T
Melvin Strobl c604cfdf3b Device security and robustness (openpanel C0): check code, pnc, lenient report
- POST /devices/pair answers a 2-character `check`, listed by /devices/pending
  and shown beside each waiting entry; five codes a minute per address, and at
  50 waiting the oldest gives way instead of a 429
- portal-minted device tokens are asked for with the device's nonce (`pnc`) and
  held against it, so unpair and delete revoke them; one without `pnc` stands
  only while the nonce is 0
- a device credential acts as the device (`device_principal`), not as the
  approving superuser, so deleting that account unpairs nothing
- the report is validated port by port: unknown enum values read as `unknown`,
  unreadable ports and sections are left out and logged, `config` may name an
  entry of `config_schemas`; 422 only for no schema 1 or no object
- devices.json is parsed once per change (cached by stat), delete drops the
  report and keeps the nonce, a busy recheck runs in the background
- scope and io only from enabled flows (start/stop tells the devices), a port
  bound twice gives one io row
- the Devices tab's saves cancel and hold back device refetches until settled
2026-10-16 19:26:05 +02:00

247 lines
8.0 KiB
Python

import base64
import uuid
from datetime import UTC, datetime, timedelta
from functools import lru_cache
from typing import Any
import jwt
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import serialization
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric import rsa
from pwdlib import PasswordHash
from pwdlib.hashers.argon2 import Argon2Hasher
from pwdlib.hashers.bcrypt import BcryptHasher
from fluksio.core.config import settings
password_hash = PasswordHash(
(
Argon2Hasher(),
BcryptHasher(),
)
)
ALGORITHM = "HS256"
#: MCP tokens are signed with a keypair of their own, so the public half can be
#: published and the whole set revoked by rotating it — without logging anyone
#: out of the browser, and without the resource server needing the secret that
#: signs browser sessions.
OAUTH_ALGORITHM = "RS256"
#: The one scope an MCP token carries.
MCP_SCOPE = "mcp"
#: What a remote worker's credential says it is for. Its own audience, so an
#: agent's token cannot attach a worker and a worker's cannot call the API.
WORKER_SCOPE = "worker"
WORKER_AUDIENCE = "fluksio-worker"
#: What a paired wall panel's credential says it is for. Its own audience, so
#: the session decode refuses it outright and the scope check in ``deps`` is
#: the only door it fits.
PANEL_AUDIENCE = "fluksio-panel"
def create_access_token(subject: str | Any, expires_delta: timedelta) -> str:
expire = datetime.now(UTC) + expires_delta
to_encode = {"exp": expire, "sub": str(subject)}
encoded_jwt = jwt.encode(to_encode, settings.SECRET_KEY, algorithm=ALGORITHM)
return encoded_jwt
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
# OAuth signing key
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
def _load_or_create_key() -> rsa.RSAPrivateKey:
"""The RSA key MCP tokens are signed with, generated on first use."""
path = settings.OAUTH_PRIVATE_KEY_FILE
if path.exists():
loaded = serialization.load_pem_private_key(path.read_bytes(), password=None)
if not isinstance(loaded, rsa.RSAPrivateKey):
raise TypeError(f"{path} is not an RSA private key")
return loaded
key = rsa.generate_private_key(public_exponent=65537, key_size=2048)
path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
path.write_bytes(
key.private_bytes(
encoding=serialization.Encoding.PEM,
format=serialization.PrivateFormat.PKCS8,
encryption_algorithm=serialization.NoEncryption(),
)
)
path.chmod(0o600)
return key
@lru_cache(maxsize=1)
def oauth_key() -> rsa.RSAPrivateKey:
return _load_or_create_key()
def public_jwks() -> dict[str, Any]:
"""The public half, for anything that wants to check a token itself."""
numbers = oauth_key().public_key().public_numbers()
def b64(value: int) -> str:
raw = value.to_bytes((value.bit_length() + 7) // 8, "big")
return base64.urlsafe_b64encode(raw).rstrip(b"=").decode("ascii")
return {
"keys": [
{
"kty": "RSA",
"use": "sig",
"alg": OAUTH_ALGORITHM,
"kid": "fluksio-oauth",
"n": b64(numbers.n),
"e": b64(numbers.e),
}
]
}
def create_oauth_access_token(
user_id: uuid.UUID, client_id: uuid.UUID, expires_delta: timedelta
) -> str:
"""An access token for the MCP channel, told apart from a browser session.
The ``mcp`` claim is what the MCP endpoint checks: a perfectly valid token
from someone's browser is refused there, so agent traffic never arrives
looking like a person's.
"""
now = datetime.now(UTC)
payload = {
"sub": str(user_id),
"iss": settings.oauth_issuer,
"aud": settings.mcp_resource,
"iat": now,
"exp": now + expires_delta,
"mcp": True,
"client_id": str(client_id),
"scope": MCP_SCOPE,
}
return jwt.encode(
payload,
oauth_key().private_bytes(
encoding=serialization.Encoding.PEM,
format=serialization.PrivateFormat.PKCS8,
encryption_algorithm=serialization.NoEncryption(),
),
algorithm=OAUTH_ALGORITHM,
headers={"kid": "fluksio-oauth"},
)
def create_worker_token(
name: str,
expires_delta: timedelta,
labels: list[str] | None = None,
jti: str | None = None,
) -> str:
"""A credential a remote worker presents when it dials in.
Signed with the same keypair the agent tokens use, and told apart from them
by its audience: a worker's token grants no API access, and an agent's
opens no worker connection. It names the worker and the labels it may
carry, so a worker cannot claim work meant for another machine, and its
`jti` is what revoking one token rather than the whole key goes by.
"""
now = datetime.now(UTC)
payload = {
"sub": name,
"iss": settings.oauth_issuer,
"aud": WORKER_AUDIENCE,
"iat": now,
"exp": now + expires_delta,
"scope": WORKER_SCOPE,
"labels": sorted(set(labels or [])),
"jti": jti or uuid.uuid4().hex,
}
return jwt.encode(
payload,
oauth_key().private_bytes(
encoding=serialization.Encoding.PEM,
format=serialization.PrivateFormat.PKCS8,
encryption_algorithm=serialization.NoEncryption(),
),
algorithm=OAUTH_ALGORITHM,
headers={"kid": "fluksio-oauth"},
)
def decode_worker_token(token: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
"""Validate a worker credential. Raises ``InvalidTokenError`` if it does not."""
payload: dict[str, Any] = jwt.decode(
token,
oauth_key().public_key(),
algorithms=[OAUTH_ALGORITHM],
audience=WORKER_AUDIENCE,
issuer=settings.oauth_issuer,
)
return payload
def create_panel_token(
panel: str, user_id: uuid.UUID | str, expires_delta: timedelta, nonce: int = 0
) -> str:
"""The credential a paired wall panel holds.
Signed with the app's own secret like a browser session, and told apart
from one by its audience. ``sub`` records the account that approved the
pairing. The panel acts as itself rather than as that account (see
``deps.device_principal``), so deleting the account leaves it paired. The
``panel`` claim is what the request filter in ``fluksio.api.deps`` holds
it to: that panel's dashboards and the message endpoints its widgets need.
``pnc`` is the panel's nonce at the moment of pairing, and the filter
refuses a credential naming any other. Bumping the panel's nonce is
therefore how one screen is re-paired without deleting the panel out from
under its dashboards.
Long-lived on purpose: a wall tablet is set up once and left running, and
it has no keyboard to log in again with.
"""
now = datetime.now(UTC)
payload = {
"sub": str(user_id),
"aud": PANEL_AUDIENCE,
"panel": panel,
"pnc": nonce,
"iat": now,
"exp": now + expires_delta,
}
return jwt.encode(payload, settings.SECRET_KEY, algorithm=ALGORITHM)
def decode_panel_token(token: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
"""Validate a panel credential. Raises ``InvalidTokenError`` if it does not."""
payload: dict[str, Any] = jwt.decode(
token,
settings.SECRET_KEY,
algorithms=[ALGORITHM],
audience=PANEL_AUDIENCE,
)
return payload
def decode_oauth_token(token: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
"""Validate an MCP token. Raises ``InvalidTokenError`` if it does not hold."""
payload: dict[str, Any] = jwt.decode(
token,
oauth_key().public_key(),
algorithms=[OAUTH_ALGORITHM],
audience=settings.mcp_resource,
issuer=settings.oauth_issuer,
)
return payload
def verify_password(
plain_password: str, hashed_password: str
) -> tuple[bool, str | None]:
return password_hash.verify_and_update(plain_password, hashed_password)
def get_password_hash(password: str) -> str:
return password_hash.hash(password)