A dashboard went live the moment it was created — an empty document straight to
the panels — while a new flow starts as a draft. It now works the way flows do:
published means `dashboard.json` exists, so every dashboard on every running
installation is already published and nothing needs migrating. Only the ones
created from here on start as drafts.
Mirroring FlowStore turned up a latent 500: discarding the draft of a dashboard
that had never been published unlinked its only file, and the read that followed
raised out of a 200 handler. It answers 400 now, the way a flow does.
Publishing all of them was 2N requests, because a publish has to name the
version it expects and the summaries did not carry one. They do now — and so do
the flow summaries, which had the same defect nobody had written down.
A panel had no way to hear about any of this. A publish, or a change to which
dashboards a panel carries, now puts one event on the bus and the screen
refetches what changed: no reload, so a wall display never blanks or asks for
its credential again. The subtle half is that a socket's message allowlist was
computed once at handshake — a reassigned panel would have fetched its new
document and then shown tiles that never updated.
The panels dialog logged non-superusers out. Every write in it needs a
superuser, not only the checkboxes the report mentioned, so the dialog is
read-only for everyone else. The logout itself was `main.tsx` treating 403 as a
dead session, against the contract deps.py spells out: only a 401 ends a
session, and a 403 now says so rather than silently signing someone out.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Uq8mtNb97A7praJLyeEYgs
An installation enrolled before per-user mapping has nobody mapped, and
fail-closed means its owner is refused. Re-enrolling fixes it and can only
be done from the machine's own network, which is the wrong thing to require
of a machine whose only route in is the portal.
The hub names the owner in the handshake now, and this takes it: if the
enrolling account has no portal identity and nobody else holds that one, it
is written once and every later attach is a no-op. A mapping somebody else
holds is never moved - enrolment was told who that is, and this is only a
repair. A failure to write one does not drop the link.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Remote access used to collapse every portal session onto the account that
performed the enrolment. That was the only thing it could do while nothing
here knew who was at the other end, and it is why letting a second person
in meant handing them the first one's account.
`user.portal_sub` is where a portal identity meets a local one: set for the
enrolling superuser at enrolment, and for each person a superuser admits
afterwards through Settings -> Remote access -> Add remote user. The code
they type comes from the newcomer's own portal account, and it is redeemed
against the hub with this installation's tunnel credential rather than with
a portal session, so being let in is not itself the power to let others in.
The account created is never a superuser, which closes the same door from
this side.
A proxy token now resolves through that mapping and nowhere else. An
identity nobody mapped resolves to no user rather than falling back on the
enroller, so deleting the local row under Admin -> Users is the whole of
the revocation: it bites on a credential already in flight, and it does not
wait on the portal being reachable to be told. Telling the portal is best
effort for exactly that reason.
The cost is stated where it lands, in DEPLOY.md: an installation enrolled
before this has no mapping, so its owner reconnects once with a fresh code.
Panels and the health summary still act as the enrolling account - neither
of them is a person, and neither gained a way to name one.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Three things the security pass on the portal pairing turned up. The first two
were already true of a screen on the local network; what changed is that a
panel credential is now presentable from the internet, which is what makes
them worth closing rather than recording.
The artifact endpoint authenticates for itself, because a worker's credential
has to open it and that token is no use anywhere else. It resolved the caller
without handing over the request, so the one credential that is scoped by
route was judged by no route at all — a panel could read and write the store
as whoever approved it. It passes the request it already holds now.
The websocket has no route to judge either, and there the bound has to be on
what is sent: a panel is given the values its own dashboards draw and nothing
else — no node status, no logs, no shape of the graph. The keys stay in the
message, emptied, because a screen on a wall runs the bundle it was paired
with. `messages_for` reads that set off the published dashboards, and is the
walk the `/messages/` allowlist has wanted for a while.
And locality is no longer a header anyone can type. The marker the connector
stamps is a value minted per process, so reaching this API directly cannot buy
a device the credential meant for one that cannot reach it at all.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_017F9RnYCJgASuBTcAjxmnsp
A screen somewhere this installation is not reachable from asks the portal for
a code instead, and the portal mints its credential — because a token signed
here is one such a device could never present.
Where it was minted changes nothing about what it may do. The panel gate moved
off the branch that decodes a local panel token and onto whatever claims name
a panel, so the portal's and this installation's are bounded by the same check
against the same panel's dashboards. A token of that scope naming no panel is
refused rather than left holding the account it borrows.
The connector marks what arrives on its socket, since that is the only thing
that makes it true, and the approval screen now names what is holding a code —
approving adopts whatever answers, so it is worth a look first.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_017F9RnYCJgASuBTcAjxmnsp
The brain graph counts node_executed events client-side and the websocket is
torn down on every shell change, so anything a flow published during the
navigation gap was lost. The bus now keeps a session tally per qualified node
and the snapshot hands it back, letting a reconnecting client catch up.
Both the route and the tunnel connector build that snapshot from one helper
so the portal cannot drift from the direct connection.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HTsT1isxUjw5gtkJk8WhuA
An installation can be enrolled with a portal by redeeming a claim code, after
which it holds one authenticated websocket open and answers proxied API calls
over it. Requests are dispatched into this process's own ASGI app, so the HTTP
trigger routes flows install at runtime are visible to it, and the live flow
stream is bridged straight off the event bus.
decode_token grows the third branch its docstring anticipated: tokens signed by
the enrolled portal resolve to the local account that performed the enrolment,
verified against a JWKS pinned at that moment. With no enrolment the branch
raises immediately, so an offline installation is unchanged and untouched.
Disconnecting deletes one file, which is the entire local revocation.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01XtBzdDyLsmDaF1W7DLYtYM
stroblmeandClaude Opus 5