Writing node source, installing modules and any flow save that adds,
retypes or repoints a code node (Function, Command), edits a Command
node's settings or changes a node's resources.env now answer 403 for
everyone but a superuser. MCP tools and the assistant reach the same
routes, so they inherit the gate. Node types report runs_code.
The editor shows code read-only with a note, disables a Command node's
settings, leaves code nodes and reusable nodes out of the palette and
paste, and the Modules page offers no install.
An MCP access token is a stateless JWT good until it expires, so deleting
the client row revoked nothing already handed out — on the MCP endpoint or
on the REST API, which takes the same token directly. Both doors now look
the client up by the `client_id` the token has always carried, so tokens
already in circulation are held to it too.
A dashboard's `locked` setting stopped the client drawing a control and
nothing else; the server took a publish from a panel showing it anyway. It
now bounds the panel's write scope, resolved live where a flow drives the
flag, exactly as the client resolves it. Reads are untouched — read-only is
not blind — and so is a querying chart's request, which is how that tile
reads rather than something anyone touched.
A wheel whose top-level module is `app` collides with anything else in a
user's venv, so the package that is about to be published takes the name
it is published under. Only the Python package moves; the repo, the
Docker WORKDIR and the compose project keep theirs.
The engine now speaks MCP at /mcp, with a built-in OAuth 2.1 authorization
server in front of it: an agent registers itself, sends a human to the browser
to approve it, and exchanges the resulting code for a token. PKCE is required,
codes are single-use and stored only as hashes, the browser is redirected to
the URI that was registered rather than the one asked for, and refresh tokens
rotate so that replaying a spent one revokes the whole line.
Twenty tools cover reading, building, publishing and running flows, and each
one calls the same REST endpoint the dashboard calls, in-process, carrying the
caller's own token. That keeps one description of what a flow is and what may
be done to it — validation, the draft/publish split, the version check — and
means an agent can do nothing a person could not do in the browser.
Agent tokens are RS256 with a keypair of their own rather than the secret that
signs browser sessions, so deleting the key withdraws every agent without
logging anyone out, and deps.decode_token grew the branch that trusting a
second issuer will need when the hosted login arrives.