Make the docs state things rather than argue them

The site read as a design journal: rationale paragraphs, hedges
("deliberately", "on purpose", "genuinely"), meta-commentary about the docs
themselves, and one em-dash every ten lines carrying an aside.

Roughly twenty rationale blocks are gone or reduced to what a reader needs
in order to use the thing. Em-dashes go from 507 to 135, and what is left is
structural rather than prose: list and definition separators, table cells,
and four inside code blocks that quote what the CLI actually prints.

Also: api.example.com becomes api.fluksio.com (the emails stay, since
bootstrap.py really defaults to admin@example.com and RFC 2606 reserves it);
the mqtt table gains the two settings it had drifted behind on and inject's
wording matches the engine; llms.txt lists the two connector pages that were
in the nav but not in it; and the two device/device_policy notes now agree.

Builds clean under `zensical build --strict`.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015YrQnKV3bnQd4K342y8tKj

docs/code/agents.md

@@ -11,16 +11,16 @@ build, publish and run flows.
 MCP_ENABLED=true
 ```
 
-It is off by default, because switching it on opens client registration to
-whoever can reach the host. Turn it on deliberately.
+It is off by default: switching it on opens client registration to whoever can
+reach the host.
 
-The endpoint is `https://api.${DOMAIN}/mcp` — or `http://api.localhost/mcp` on
-a local stack.
+The endpoint is `https://api.${DOMAIN}/mcp`, or `http://api.localhost/mcp` on a
+local stack.
 
 ## Connecting a client
 
 ```sh
-claude mcp add --transport http fluksio https://api.example.com/mcp
+claude mcp add --transport http fluksio https://api.fluksio.com/mcp
 ```
 
 The OAuth flow does the rest: the client registers itself, you approve it in
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ the browser, and it exchanges the grant for a token. Nothing to paste.
 
 An agent acts as **the person who approved it**, and only through the same REST
 API the dashboard uses. It cannot do anything you could not do in the browser,
-and it cannot do anything *you* cannot do — an agent approved by a non-superuser
+and it cannot do anything *you* cannot do. An agent approved by a non-superuser
 is not one either.
 
 Its tokens are signed with a keypair of their own, kept beside the flow store.
@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ Read-only:
 | `get_message_history` | one message's recent numeric values |
 | `get_graph` | every flow as one graph |
 | `list_shared_nodes` | the shared library and its usages |
-| `list_secrets` | secret **names** — never values |
+| `list_secrets` | secret **names**, never values |
 | `get_modules` | the packages node code can import |
 | `get_health` | flows, nodes, queue and loop lag |
 | `get_metrics` | executions, errors and timings per minute |
@@ -87,10 +87,10 @@ Operating:
 The tools do not reach into the engine. Each one calls the same REST endpoint
 the dashboard calls, over an in-process transport.
 
-That keeps exactly one description of what a flow is and how it may be changed
-— the validation, the draft/publish split, the version check that stops two
-clients overwriting each other. An agent that saved a flow through a private
-back door would be an agent that could write one the canvas cannot open.
+That keeps exactly one description of what a flow is and how it may be changed:
+the validation, the draft/publish split, and the version check that stops two
+clients overwriting each other. An agent saving a flow through a private back
+door could write one the canvas cannot open.
 
 The caller's token rides along on every hop, so the API sees the agent's own
 identity rather than a service account. The audit trail on Home names it.
@@ -105,7 +105,7 @@ you what the canvas would have told you.
 ## Limits
 
 - MCP is not currently reachable through a [portal](../interface/portal.md)
-  tunnel — the proxy forwards `/api/v1/` only. Connect an agent on the same
+  tunnel: the proxy forwards `/api/v1/` only. Connect an agent on the same
   network as the instance.
 - Secrets are never readable, by an agent or by anyone else. `list_secrets`
   returns names.